The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty refl exivity (Burrell, 1997; Czarniawska, 2003; Parker, 1995; Van Maanen, 1995; Weick, 1999 Weick, , 2002 many 'theorists' in organization analysis seem to be grappling with the consequences of this 'end of theory', or at least responding to a sensed unease about the totalizing and representational prejudices associated with the meta-narrative of Grand Theory (see Eagleton, 2003; Game, 1991; Latour, 1988; Young, 1982) . There is certainly no shortage of 'theory' in organizational analysis: psychoanalytical; sociological; various forms of political and economic theory; we have literary and philosophical theory; and in recent times what is called postmodern and poststructural theory. If we are to judge by the spate of recent publications and edited collections, theory has never had it so good (see Clegg et al., 1996; Hassard and Hodgson, 2005; Hassard and Parker, 1994; Jones and Munro, 2005; Reed and Hughes, 1993; Tsoukas and Knudsen, 2003; Westwood and Clegg, 2003) , and to be recognized as a Theorist in organization analysis is still to enjoy the status of intellectual privilege and elevation.
Yet, what is it that defi nes the 'theoretical'? If we cannot be certain about a defi nition of theory we may suffer an even greater confusion about what it is that holds us together as a community of scholars-for theory, and theoretically disciplined and informed analysis, provides the grounds for the claim that scholarship offers deeper insight and a higher degree of awareness and understanding. The question of theoretical excess will cause a certain disquiet and uneasiness about what, in fact, organization is-and how one might begin to study it. Without subject or object, writing and publication in organization studies threatens to fall into the hiatus of an aporia. The excess and proliferation of various schools of thought might be an understandable reaction to the anxieties stimulated by the dawning of this epistemological-ontological uncertainty, but paradoxically this proliferation marks an increasing disorganization in organization. Any effort to synthesize and organize, to survey and master the fi eld in a way that Burrell and Morgan (1979) were once able to achieve, would, today, be folly indeed. This paper traces a crisis in theory and organization that is leading to what we call here a cacophony of voices, a 'dada' of incoherence and contradiction, but an incoherence that can be seen nonetheless to be implicated in 'real world' consequences and effects. One response to this crisis would be to return to a set of epistemological and ontological axioms that could secure a dominant mono-paradigm disciplinarity in which the least credible and least effective forms of organizational theory could be weeded-out and eliminated (cf. Pfeffer, 1993) . We could then agree a common understanding of what organization is and what the most suitable Theory and methods are for studying it, an agreement that would in the process help resolve the basic purposes of organization theory and analysis. A number of writers argue that effective organization analysis can only be exercised with any degree of rigour and legitimacy if it adopts and refi nes the methods of realist natural science in which a basic set of foundational principles meticulously derived from the logic of positivist or 'neo-positivist' analytical philosophy structure and govern theoretical and analytical development (Baum, 2002; Donaldson, 1996; McKelvey, 1997 McKelvey, , 2003 Pugh, 1998) . We examine and debate Organization 14(6) Articles the work of McKelvey as representative of this response. He provides one of the most ambitious developments of neo-positivist analysis and the careful treatment of his work allows us to draw out and delineate the contours of an alternative mode of organization analysis that we call here 'theorizing'.
Theorizing is stimulated when theory meets theatre, in the performance of text, producing estrangement effects similar to the Brechtian 'verfremdung'. The quest to expose the devices upon which this artifice has been constructed helps cultivate an attentiveness to dimensions of organization 'in-between' habitual dualisms and outside the customary logic of organization analysis. To enter(tain) the en-trance to a theatricalization of everyday life in organization (cf. Mangham and Overington, 1987) casts into relief 'objects' in organization in ways that make them appear to behave like those highly charged and undecidable moments in the deconstructive textual readings of Derrida ('trace', 'difference', 'pharmakon', 'hymen', 'supplement', etc.) . This form of theorizing allows us to more fully acknowledge and embrace the inevitable tautologies, solipsistic tendencies, and infi nite regresses associated with all forms of knowledge and theoretical endeavour (see Ashmore, 1989) and displays a commitment to a 'form of life' (Blum, 1974) that is more vital, experimental, and emancipatory in its struggle with the question of organization. We argue that organization studies today resembles a machine that is out of control, an 'ambulatory automatism' (Hacking, 1999) that is symptomatic of the end, or perhaps the impossibility, of 'the social'. However, organization analysis can respond to this crisis if it can recover its capacity for 'theorizing' in a practice that helps navigate and understand contemporary organization-but only insofar as organization analysis is prepared to embrace its absurdity and surrealism and learn to accept that truth may be error, and fact, fi ction. Theorizing opens up possibilities for new cartographies and new ways of story telling in organization. Theory is one such 'fetish' object in organization analysis. In theorizing theory we take Theory for a walk and string it out a little, to let it take fl ight, rather like a shimmering oriental carpet. 'Pataphysical experiments and the practice of theory as θεωρia, as travel and adventure, provide some suggestive modes of theorizing that welcomes and admits the necessity and inevitability of theory as a 'deterritorializing activity' in the struggle to respond to the challenge of contemporary organization.
Organizing The End of Theory and the Rise of the Post-Theoretical
In recent years the status of theory in the social sciences and in the academy more broadly has been the subject of considerable debate and anxiety in which a number of prognoses of its failures and inadequacies have been variously proposed (see Botting, 1993; Carroll, 1990; Docherty, 1996; Eagleton, 2003; McQuillan et al., 1999; Payne and Schad, 2003; Rabate, 2002) . At its most general and fundamental, the status of 'Theory' as a The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty consistent set of tools of analysis, or guiding meta-narrative, has become highly problematic in the wake of the challenge posed to the metaphysics of western reason by developments in post-structural and deconstructive writing. The various crises of humanism (Carrol, 1993) , representation, and the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence brought about by developments in various forms of post-structuralism, have dented confi dence in the capacity of theorists to construct the kind of vast bureaucratic machines of thought typifi ed by those paragons of Theory in the social sciences: Parsonian structural functionalism; Althuserrian structuralism; or the Marxist dialectical schemas of historical evolution. The popularization of Derrida and the increasing use of his work in the social sciences has also helped expose a performative contradiction that lies at the heart of Theory to leave many uncertain about its value and legitimacy (Botting, 1993; Genosko, 1998; McQuillan et al., 1999) . This contradiction fi nds expression in a number of ways, most clearly through the difference that is manifest in terms of what an author tells us they are doing and what a text displays: To claim that 'this paper offers a theoretical treatise', for example, is a statement that is usually not subject to its own criteria-it is a proposition that is not 'theoretical' or necessarily derived from the discourse or terms generated out of theoretical endeavour. Theory is variously seen as an impossible and frustrating project tainted with totalizing, hegemonic, masculine and phallogocentric pretension. It often serves as an institutionalizing edifi ce or defence into which the theorist retreats from the real challenge of thinking. At worst, Theory becomes a narcissistic and sublimated identity project, an avenue for self-aggrandisement and will-to-power, but also, and paradoxically, a 'supplement' to a more basic existential lack (Lacan, 1977) .
If the development of theory in organization studies has been derivative of sociology, the social sciences, or the more fundamental principles established in philosophy, it might be expected that similar anxieties and questions about the status, purpose and meaning of its theory will have been distilled and debated. This is not to suggest that theory is lacking in organization studies. There has been no end of anthologies and publications introducing new theorists, concepts, perspectives, and philosophies as a way of stimulating or re-orientating theoretical work in organization (see Hassard and Hodgson, 2005) . Everything from Antonin Artaud and Krishnamurti (see Letiche, 2005; McInnes and Beech, 2005) to 'Eco and the Bunnymen' and piss-fi lled water pistols (Burrell, 1993) seems to have been plundered in an effort to introduce 'novelty' or revolutionize the study of organization. We might trace the history of this proliferation back to the quartet of publications in Organization Studies by Burrell introducing postmodernism, Foucault, Derrida, and Habermas (Burrell, 1988, 1994; Cooper, 1989; Cooper and Burrell, 1988 ). Yet, apart from a momentary pique of interest, these contributions rarely provide the basis for further enquiry or the establishment of a serious research programme. One might Organization 14(6) Articles say that the most enduring implication has been the inspiration to others to search in the archives to recover their own proto-organizational theorist, to reclaim that long neglected and overlooked writer in the avant-garde of organization analysis. Routinely classifi ed as theoretical they may well be, but these papers are really little more than summaries and expositions. Essays on Bergson or Deleuze may be published as 'theoretical' (Linstead, 2002; Thanem, 2004; Wood and Ferlie, 2003) but any close study of these texts soon reveals their writing to be little more than overview and summary exposition. The theory or the practical craft of theorizing is lost. Anything distinctively Deleuzian is typically excised from these papers, and if what is distilled is supposed to exhibit or demonstrate 'organization theory', we are forced to conclude that it remains derivative, formulaic, and procedural it its execution.
2 In any survey of the anthologies of organization theory it is clear that most 'theoretical' work today remains generalized commentary, interpretation and application. It does not perform as theory, nor does it seem terribly preoccupied with a careful exposition of thought from fi rst principles that originary theory and theorising would seem to demand.
To take just one of the many texts that explicitly address the question of 'Organization Theory' (Hatch, 1997) , we fi nd the following claims: 'Theory rests on a set of assumptions that forms the foundations for a series of logically interrelated claims', and, 'theory is an explanation, that is, it is an attempt to explain a segment of experience in the world' (Hatch, 1997: 9) . At the very outset we might want to ask whether these defi nitions are not, themselves, theoretical in nature. Moreover, theory as foundation and explanation, available for 'application' and 'use' (Hatch, 1997: 16) , is a peculiarly rational, pragmatic and utilitarian understanding for a text that otherwise wants to introduce the challenge of postmodernism in organization theory. Instead, following what now seems to be the obligatory and cursory discussion of the problems of epistemology and ontology in organization analysis, Hatch proceeds to describe and defi ne the concepts and multiple perspectives available in organization theory. In 'this book you will encounter other people's concepts and their general descriptions and definitions', she writes. The readers' task, we are instructed, is to 'make these concepts your own by relating them to your own experience'. In addition, and this is the crucial move-to 'make a concept your own requires that you build it upon a foundation of your own experiences and meanings' (Hatch, 1997: 10-11) .
Hatch basically provides a dictionary or encyclopaedia of theoriesalthough at times it is confusing whether we are dealing with 'theory', 'concepts' or 'perspectives' in organization theory. This confusion is perhaps most evident where she summarizes part 1 of the book: 'What is Organization Theory?' The 'theme of this book', she writes, is 'that familiarity with the variety of metaphors, theories and perspectives offered by organization theory will enhance your knowledge and theorising skills …' (Hatch, 1997: 56) . In sum, theory is offered by organization theory to enhance The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty what she calls 'theorizing'. This is a fascinating and complex, almost 'triple' tautology, a recursive loop reciting the title 'theory'-but void of any self-conscious or refl exively consistent theorizing-which perhaps might explain these moments of textual fl oundering, of folly and fall. Essentially, and despite these digressive aporias and mise-en-abymes that the text occasionally falls into, her writing is conventionally descriptive and expository, deploying the orthodox retinue of classifi cation, tabulation and taxonomy. Although her book is titled Organization Theory we do not get anything distinctively 'organization theory', nor do we witness or participate in the exercise of theoretical labour. To do so would require that we at least interrogate the question whether experience and meaning are, as the claim suggests, foundational. What is experience and meaning? Is it something that pre-exists theory? Moreover, what is the status of this 'relating', in the instruction to relate concepts to experience?
It seems that we are confronted with a paradoxical situation in which there is both an excess of 'theory' in organization studies, but little 'organization theory', and even less 'theorizing' in organization (see Blum, 1971 Blum, , 1974 . This comes at a time when, as remarked by many, we are confronted with polyversity and lack of ontological certainty in organization and its study. Burrell (1997) , for example, fi nds a pandemonium of time-space compression in contemporary organization, one inhabited by magicians and devils, bizarre sado-masochistic couplings of man and beast, Dionysiac cults and Mafi osi. For Gabriel (1995) , on the other hand, these are the regions in organization where fantasy and dreams migrate to breed with reality. Just below the surface of paramount reality these dynamics generate an undercurrent of energy that fi nds periodic but unpredictable expression in the discharge of frustration and discontent. Cooper (1997) , using a different set of intellectual resources, discovers organization as processual fl uidity characterized by complexity and instability in which the real is never more than transient and ephemeral. Its objects and subjects wax and wane in fi ssile combination, and which the media of generalized communication renders 'unheimlich' (Vattimo, 1992) -unstable between hallucination and reality, fact or fi ction. Edwards (2003) , by contrast, along with many practitioners of contemporary labour process analysis (see Thompson and Warhurst, 1998) , still fi nds organization populated and engineered by the procedures and committees of 'shop stewards' and 'human resource managers', who continue to deploy things called 'strategy' and 'control' in the negotiation of a 'wage-effort bargain'. Here, there is no truck with 'hirsute wildmen' or the surreal dreamscape of ontological confusion. In order to make some kind of sense of this polyversity and heterogeneity the metaphors of labyrinth and the ruin have been suggested (Burrell, 1997; Schatzki, 2005) . As metaphors they depict the precarious condition of organizing and organization theory in a world that seems to be composed of inconstancy and inconsistency. The ruins of epistemological and ontological foundation might also help explain a return to the seemingly more modest task of 'writing' uncluttered with the arcane discourse of high theory Organization 14(6) Articles and continental philosophy (see Grey and Sinclair, 2006) . Contemporary organization analysis increasingly prefers the modesty of local narratives, the experimental essay, the ludic or ephemeral interjection, and stories and anecdotes of organization that do not seem to aspire to any overarching consistency or integration of project or commitment (see Basboll, 2004; Jones and O'Doherty, 2005; O'Doherty and Case, 2003; Rehn, 2004) . Some, for example, have begun to experiment with the collage and the fragmented text (Burrell, 1997; Grafton-Small, 2001; Westwood, 1999) in ways that recall the work of Adorno (1981) , Benjamin (1999) and Blanchot (1995) , who in their different ways argued that the fragment can be the only form of writing that effectively speaks and responds to the inconstancy and unreliability of late modernity. In the absence of an overarching disciplinary project, or the kind of coherence that Parsons once provided in sociology, we see emerging series of semi-autonomous, loose assemblages of writers sympathetic to each others work forming networks around ephemeral and contingent issues that rapidly proliferate with stylistic innovation and specialized, often arcane discourse. All manner of creation and subjects are now seemingly legitimate material for organization analysis-from the 'female orgasm' (Linstead, 2000) , to 'jump-cutting the force-feel of electronic sound's material creativity to make immaterial connections' (Beeston, 2001:87) . Others have examined the contribution of the melancholic 'Black Widow' (Hopfl , 1997) to the understanding of contemporary organization, whilst there are those who debate the contribution of 'the blowjob' in organization, a concept created out of a study of the work of musician/writer Captain Beefheart and apparently inspired by the jazz (dis)articulations of Albert Ayler (Kaulingfreks and ten Bos, 2005) .
These 'post-' or 'anti-theory' narratives, however, typically neglect the problematic conditions of possibility for their fabulous tales from the fi eld. The kind of 'theorizing-organization' we are introducing here seeks to retrieve and re-member the grounds that evoke and compel these insights and the desire to tell them. Here, in the inevitable 'refl exivity of refl exivity' that attends this retrieval (Ashmore, 1989; Mehan and Wood, 1975 ) 'all compasses go wild', as Latour writes, and the excess of the jewel encrusted tortoise shell becomes this verbose sentence suggesting that organization analysts need 'to fi nd another way of orienting themselves' (Latour, 1981: 201) . One consequence of this epistemological and ontological refl exivity is that the proverbial objects and furniture of organizations are likely to lose their familiar stability and habitual classifi cation. This also stimulates the conditions in which routines and typical events in organization can be cast in new light. Wieder (1974) , for example, generates a classic example of this where his writing induces a powerful estrangement effect turning what seems to be a regular meeting of staff and inmates in a halfway house into the appearance of an orchestrated theatre-piece-and one that is, moreover, seemingly without an 'author'. His writing both conveys and induces the paranoia and the vertigo of what Laing (1967) would call 'ontological insecurity' that Wieder himself seems to have experienced during his research The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty and wishes to maintain in his text-or, rather, is compelled to maintain given his ambitions for an 'authentic' writing that speaks into and out of the kind of phenomenology his research discovers in organization. The practice of theorizing here-now refl ects and invites a similar intensifi cation and a heightening of experience that removes the ground beneath our feet in ways that encourage the opening of the refl exive abyss (cf: Chia, 1996: 67-93) . We are now, it seems, walking on tortoise shells.
The Possibilities of a Quasi-Natural Science in Organization Analysis
The protocols of natural science and its positivist or neo-positivist agenda offers, for many, the most rigorous response to the problems and dilemmas thrown up by the metaphysical aporias and confusions of contemporary organization theory (see for example, Baum and McKelvey, 1999; Donaldson, 1996; McKelvey, 2003; Pfeffer, 1982 Pfeffer, , 1993 Pugh, 1998) . In this kind of organizational science, analysis begins with an economical and bareminimum of starting assumption that seeks to avoid the 'anything goes' mentality of the post-theoretical. The ambition in positivist enquiry is to remove all metaphysical and subjective interference that gets in the way of the collection of data so that what is left is pure, unadulterated and direct experience of a measurable, objective and autonomous reality. Knowledge can be acquired independent of political prejudice or value judgement as Theory builds through inductive or hypothetico-deductive reasoning to seek prediction and control of external reality in ways that preserve or improve what is presumed to be a natural law or order.
In organization studies the contribution of Bill McKelvey (1997 McKelvey ( , 2003 ) offers one of the most interesting developments of natural science methodology that seems to allow for the kind of vibrant and 'processual' ontology in organization opened up by the various strands of 'contra-science postpositivisms' (as McKelvey calls it)-which includes, for McKelvey, practitioners of social constructionism (e.g. Bloor, Latour), phenomenology, critical theory and postmodernism (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hassard and Parker, 1994) . While McKelvey is keen to acknowledge the advances made in the understanding of ontology by recent organization theory he still wants to establish a set of procedures and methods of scientifi c enquiry in order to guard against speculative and ungrounded subjective bias that encourages the kind of informal and often sloppy empiricism associated with postmodernism. To this end McKelvey seeks to identify and establish a set of procedures based on an arsenal of 'rules', 'truth tests', 'justifi cation logic' and what he identifi es as a 'Guttman scale of effective science ' (pp. 60-61) . McKelvey aspires to certainty, proof, and scientifi c legitimacy in order to enhance the power of organization analysis as an academic, managerial and political policy-making endeavour (cf. Pfeffer, 1993) .
Instead of the kind of plurality and difference tolerated and encouraged by postmodern trends in organization analysis, McKelvey (2003) proposes a universal 'macro-paradigm' based on the synthesis of three post-Kuhnian, Organization 14(6) Articles post-positivist programs: 'Campbellian' scientifi c realism; an evolutionary epistemology; and-following Beth (1961) -what is called a 'semantic conception of theories'. Campbellian scientifi c realism recognizes that individual subjective interpretations are inevitably intertwined with real entities in the form of 'meaning', but far from detracting from the rigour of science it is now widely held that this in fact helps strengthen epistemological coherence and validity. For McKelvey elements of the socially constructed can be incorporated into scientifi c endeavour, but over time constructivist 'error' can be whittled down by 'selectionist testing' for ontological validity. But what is this selectionist testing? All that McKelvey provides by way of explanation is that the socially constructed entities 'are tested against an objective reality' (p. 58). In his discussion of the 'semantic conception of theory' it seems as if we might be offered some elaboration on this weeding out of the less ontologically correct. Once again, in the detail of the text, we only discover that a dynamic realist epistemology only evolves in response to its testing against an objective reality, 'with a winnowing out of the less ontologically correct theoretical entities' (p. 58). The specifi c nature of these tests are not detailed but it is repeated throughout his work as a cardinal measure of scientifi c veracity and verisimilitude in ways that repeats the essential and inescapable circular and tautological logic that affl icts conventional science (see also McKelvey, 2002) . Moreover, what this objective reality is, or who or what has the authority to stand in as spokesperson or representative of this objective reality, is a discussion conspicuous by its absence. Individuals are seemingly endorsed and required to construct and invent concepts and representations, yet subjective bias and wilful idio-syncrasy is eliminated as an evolutionary epistemology ensures that an aggregate consensus emerges about real world phenomena. How McKelvey might defend this logic against accusations that it cedes to a lowest common denominator and its 'servants of power' (Baritz, 1960) is not clear.
The 'semantic conception' of theory in organizational studies seeks to exercise a form of science that is not based on foundational axiomatic assumptions but instead, evolves over time through an interaction between a priori theory, logic, models, knowledge and objective phenomena. Eschewing the ambition to represent and master universal 'Truth', semantic theories proceed on the basis of a selective abstraction of certain parameters from phenomena in order to describe and predict real world behaviour, only seeking to secure an increasing truthlikeness or verisimilitude (see McKelvey, 2003: 58-61) . Models are developed and tested for their 'internal' logical consistency-by means of what is called 'analytical adequacy', and 'ontological accuracy', which is established by way of testing postulated predictions and representations discovered through simulated modelling or idealized laboratory conditions. Once again, we are confronted with an absence and deferral. The model phenomena link tells us nothing about how what is called 'parallel subsystems' in the real world are identifi ed or carved out in a way that would make sense of the claim that it is possible The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty to independently adjudicate the veracity and legitimacy of the more theoretically derived and laboratory nurtured models. Models are also somehow vested with the status of 'autonomous mediators'; it will be recalled that for McKelvey the theoretical and the observational are inseparable (p. 52). 'Mediation', however, makes little sense if there is no ultimate backstop against which to validate the claims for predictive and representational accuracy. Otherwise, for those committed to the independence and objectivity of reality, autonomous mediation might then take on the more troubling prospect of a self-generating machine in which the world is made over in the image of its model in an autotelic like dynamic. Driven on by the tautology of its recursive and self-justifying logic, the autonomous mediation of scientifi c endeavour succeeds by the recruitment and enrolment of believers as it proceeds with its enquiry.
It would take an essay devoted entirely to the work of McKelvey's work to conclusively demonstrate the fact that this form of organizational analysis is still in thrall to the basic postulates of positivism in ways that mean his so-called 'realism' remains an invention for which there can be no empirical or logically demonstrative proof free from what he understands to be 'subjective bias'. However, we are able to briefl y note here that the apparent autonomy of scientifi c endeavour preserved in the testing of 'analytical adequacy' that is conducted through modelling and laboratory experimentation depends upon an idealistic view of science which maintains the idea that pure scientifi c thought exercises a logic and rationality that is assumed to be transcendental and supra-historical, objective and bias-free. Moreover, the idea that knowledge or logic can be free of the media and outcome of power relations would seem particularly naïve and renders his work dangerous and vulnerable to the will of a lowest common denominator. In its reduction to the lowest common denominator, organization science collaborates with the requirements of 'external users' without acknowledging or questioning the values or purposes to which its science is made to serve. Epistemology becomes a distillation of prejudice and dominant societal values that fi nds expression in a formal and logical set of axioms or procedures. In brief, the discourse of scientifi c standards and legitimacy simply represents a denial and displacement of political struggle into a technical debate concerning epistemological rigour that naturalizes the arbitrary and contingent settlements of power and inequality. As medium and outcome of these relations of power, science becomes complicit with a 'normalization' of individuals and society.
In addition to these assumptions and blind spots, McKelvey conveys a rather dull and impoverished sense of vision, possibility and ambition for the exercise of knowledge in organization analysis. It remains positivist by virtue of its reliance upon an autonomous and independent external objective reality and because of an extremely narrow and instrumental conception of the purposes of research and higher education. The adoption of 'agent-based models' (McKelvey, 2003: 60-61 There is nonetheless the inevitable practice of discursive invention and specialization in positivist and neo-positivist endeavour promoting its own hermetic language game whose persuasive rhetoric helps to give birth to all manner of bizarre and fantastic phenomena in organization. These include what McKelvey describes as 'isolated idealised systems' (which seems to resemble something like a scientifi c laboratory), 'transcendental generative processes', 'idealized substructures', 'stochastic idiosyncrasy', 'phase space' and 'phase transitions'. It is unclear whether these phenomena designate real-world entities or theoretical terms derived from 'modelling', an ambiguity that is no doubt inevitable given the status and role granted to the mediation of 'autonomous models' and the production licence bestowed on the scientifi c laboratory and its experiments. Training researchers and clients to see this phenomena helps enact and bring it into existence-the free-wheeling implications of this liberty seemingly held in check only by the discipline and toleration limits of the lowest common denominator. The claims to be in service to a pre-existing objective reality against which their representational activities are measured means that it is possibly best seen as a denied fantasy of world-making (see Goodman, 1978) , and in seeking the approval and funding of corporate clients this world-making is circumscribed and channelled by the defi nition of concrete problems 'customers' want science to fi x.
In contrast to the 'whittling down' of conceptual mediation that submits to a faith in pre-existing reality-or to the average 'lowest common denominator' pragmatism of collective agreement secured amongst self-elected specialists-theorizing pushes the consequences of the possibility that reality cannot be relied upon as a form of ontological backstop or reassurance for which stringent epistemological rules and procedures can access and confi rm. Instead, theorizing acknowledges that 'reality' has to be made and unmade as part of a contested and politicized struggle, and in this struggle theorizing attempts to open up and take us into different possible worlds that allow us to see or experience the world we think we inhabit in different ways. To this task we exercise forms of essaying and conceptual experiment that 'brush against the grain'-that will appear to some as frivolous, useless, wilful and even ludicrous (cf. Whitley, 1989)-in an effort to adumbrate and recall dimensions of organization variously repressed and denied or diffi cult to acknowledge. Theorizing here acknowledges and exploits (and seeks out) the aporias that unhinge the knowledge quest in social The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty science in an effort to exaggerate its contradictions and differences. In this sense it even welcomes positivism as a possibility of knowledge-or what we might interpret as a symptom of certain tendencies in the knowledgequest-as one way in which 'Organization' is revealed or made and against which difference can be further investigated and drawn.
Theorizing is a form of writing in organization studies that seeks by-way of refl exivity to enact and recover the aporetic grounds that provide its own conditions of possibility (but also, as limit-condition, the conditions of impossibility), as Blum (1974) has taught us in his form of analytical theorizing. However, in contrast to Blum, it does not proclaim this exercise to be a vehicle that gives access to an 'authentic' form of transcendent 'Truthspeaking' where the content and form of writing fuse in the transparency of awareness and consciousness that dialectically relate the author-self with the wider collective reader-writer. In his various writings Derrida has taught us to grapple with the abyssal qualities of what on occasion he calls the 'ground without ground', an opening to which does not provide the basis for reassurance and narrative integrity or Truth-telling. To encounter the aporetic conditions of possibility returns one to that 'savage exteriority' Foucault and Deleuze were variously seeking to tap. Here, there is no heroic once-and-for-all recovery of grounds which provides the conditions of possibility for the kind of clarity and consistency sought by Blum. There is, in other words, no 'main road' to and from 'Truth-telling' in organization. Instead the 'by-ways' of refl exivity must be continually re-opened in order to avoid the ossifi cation of thinking into the procedures and security of discourse and methodology. This means invention and trial, risk and experiment.
These returns to thought are oblique and ex-centric, rather than regular and circular, and this opening to/of thought must be repeatedly worked upon, and 'the outside' (Deleuze, 1988) of thought almost 'tricked' to produce the event of something that might be experienced as an 'immanent explosion' exiling the subject into what Deleuze calls in his various writings a 'zone of indiscernibility'. Here there is no subject or object, no differentiation of word and thing, of content and form. Theorizing does not provide the conditions for purity of articulation; instead, by virtue of its highly charged and fi ssiparous nature, it is productive of what Massumi (2002) has called 'synaesthetic becoming' that both incites but denies cognitive mastery. We therefore give chance to an extension of spontaneity and receptivity in the human subject-but as Foucault's archaeology of knowledge would suggest, this is likely to render the subject 'impractical' within the discursive practices that predominantly constitute our contemporary being-in-theworld. The movement of thought here is more visceral and labyrinthine than the sanitized and controlled, cognitive exercises in self-actualizing, hermeneutic refl exivity practiced by Blum. In this opening there is (no) primordial security, no 'concreteness of pre-theoretical experiences', as Chia (1996: 92) legislates for in the cultivation of what he calls a 'post-modern consciousness'. Instead our language here begins to sound strange and we begin to stammer and stutter as our grammar is pushed to its limit and Organization 14(6) Articles brought into crisis. It opens up a dynamic that generates a self-evacuation, marking the transformative limits of the human; it is an in-human movement (Lyotard, 1992) , rather than the recovery and reformation of self into 'correct form' that is expressive of a commitment to a certain 'form of life' (Blum, 1971: 313) .
Organization Analysis as an Ambulatory Automatism: The Academic Hoax and the End of the Social
We are beginning to see then that, on the one hand, we are confronted with practitioners of Theory, inheriting the traditions of sober, scientifi c method, but producing, nonetheless, strange and often startling, internally inconsistent fi ndings; 5 on the other, all pretence at participating in a disciplinary project that proceeds by linear, incremental steps of iteration and addition has been abandoned. Seemingly unconcerned with collective synthesis or contributing to any shared, iterative construction of a common understanding of organization that would enable communication, debate and compromise, recent developments simply prefer to promote idiosyncrasy, difference and shock. This is not to argue that academic labour does not have effects. In this section we will see that it is precisely this proliferation and its tendencies to specialization and hermetic retreat that is constitutive of potentially dangerous subjectivity and effects. When abstract from the tensions and aporias inherent to the play of truth/non-truth or fact/fi ction (the division of legitimate and illegitimate, etc.) in the knowledge quest-a 'play' organized/disorganized within the vast historical epistemes that constitute our knowing-effects take on a 'machinic' logic of their own, becoming out-ofcontrol in ways that mean the hoax is made more likely and, paradoxically, more diffi cult to detect. Consider the work of Hacking (1999) , for example, who traces the ascendancy of theories and ideas as they emerge out of a complex series of social and historical conditions. He calls these social and historical conditions of possibility an 'ecological niche', and his work examines the ways in which theory and ideas come to gain credibility and power within a complex of real world cause/effect only to fade into obscurity and irrelevance in the sands of time. In his study of 'Mad Travellers' Hacking's particular subject is the biography of a form of mental illness diagnosed in the late 19th century as 'ambulatory automatism'. His research shows how a combination of ambition and professional rivalry, creativity and imagination, interact with historically contingent socio-cultural conditions and a 'concatenation of an extraordinarily large number of diverse types of elements' (Hacking, 1999: 13) to produce theories that come to take on a life of their own. 'Ambulatory automatism' was a theory or diagnosis devised to explain the apparently inexplicable journeys and aimless wanderings of people in the late 19th century. In these cases individuals would suddenly disappear from their home and family, seemingly driven by some obscure compulsion or automation, sometimes walking thousands of miles away across the European hinterland. In a state of almost hypnotic The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty or somnambulant reverie these fugue-like wanderers would typically return home but more often that not with a complete lack of memory as to where they had been or what they had been doing.
The genesis of ambulatory automatism as a theory and explanation of this kind of behaviour can be traced from the meeting and subsequent professional relationship that developed between a Bordeaux gas fi tter, Albert Dadas, and his ambitious young doctor, Phillipe Tissié. Under the infl uence of hypnosis Dadas proved to be extremely articulate and fecund in his recollections and narration of perambulatory experience. Following the publication of Tissié's doctoral thesis in 1887 Dadas became the model for the 'mad traveller disease' that rapidly became 'a specifi c, diagnosable type of insanity' (Hacking, 1999: 8) . As Hacking writes, 'Medical reports of Albert set off a small epidemic of seemingly copycat compulsive mad voyagers whose epicenter was Bordeaux, but which soon spread to Paris, all France, Italy and, later, Germany and Russia' (Hacking, 1999: 7-8) . It is peculiar how the development and career of this theory strangely seems to duplicate or replicate the fugue-like wanderings of its putative subjects, and in that sense 'resembles recent epidemics in that it is important only at a time, in a locale, it has a vogue, spreads, decays, and the world passes on to next year's affl iction' (Hacking, 1999 : 12) (cf. Perry, 1995; Thrift, 1999) . The journals and archives housing the history of ideas seem to be littered with these kind of ephemeral and transient fashions in a pageant that displays the ruins of theory and the wreckage of intellectual projects fallen into cryptic and esoteric posterity.
The transactions of the American Gynecological Society, for example, record the development and evolution of the theory of 'xenomenia' established by Theophilus Parvin (1829-1898), and later debated and elaborated through the collective researches of its academic community. According to Parvin, xenomenia is a condition of abnormal menstruation in which menstrual blood is seen to issue from the mouth of its victim. However, some kinds of treatment and intervention do prove helpful. Where formerly there was 'decided hemoptysis and some oozing of blood from the lower lip at such periods', Parvin writes, these symptoms can be eliminated by medical intervention. An unfortunate side-effect means that patients suffer a 'great swelling of the tongue, so that for four or fi ve days each month articulation and mastication are exceedingly diffi cult', but this is relatively minor in comparison to the earlier suffering (Parvin, 1878: 135) . Spurred on by these startling fi ndings, and as same have suggested, a little piqued by his esteemed colleague's reputation and standing as president of the American Medical Association, an individual by the name of Egerton Y. Davis publishes an account of 'penis captivus' in the 4 December 1884 edition of the Philadelphia Medical News. This case was itself later revealed as a hoax. Parvin also later confesses to his hoax-but only after some 25 years of research and scholarship around the subject of 'xenomenia'. It would appear that a combination of ambition, professional rivalry and competition stimulates the most fantastic and eccentric studies creating conditions in which hoax after hoax spirals in a vertiginous excess.
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Stories such as these cast a disquieting pall over our own participation and collective research efforts in the community of organization studies. If, as Foucault shows (1972) shows, discourse has a semi-autonomous dynamic and agency of its own, we might all be victims of a wilful demiurge-if this insight is possible but to the extent that some of us are perhaps more complicit than others in working with and acknowledging the problematic nature of our knowledge claims and truth status. 6 This may cause us to wonder once again at the intention of those writing about 'blow-jobs' as organizational metaphors, or 'Ashby space' in 'Paretian ontology'. This uncertainty is exacerbated by developments in poststructural philosophy that exposit and demonstrate what is an inherent 'structural undecidability', both constitutive but also deconstructive to the social sciences and the subject of knowledge more generally. Derrida, in particular, works with this 'structural undecidability' in ways that pose vast problems for the delimitation of truth from error, or fact from fi ction. In the absence of a detailed and explicit treat-ment of Derrida's understanding of structural undecidability we can briefly identify six possible reasons why the increasingly problematic question of authenticity and truth disturbs our sense of trust in the seriousness and intentionality of author and text.
1. The loss of universal standards to judge and authenticate legitimate and illegitimate knowledge (Bauman, 1987) : to adjudicate the veracity of empirical fi ndings; or to unambiguously identify discovery from invention (Rorty, 1989) , has become a serious issue for those concerned with the truth status of their work and the wider purposes and utility of academic research. In these conditions distinguishing a hoax is diffi cult and subject to suffi cient refl exivity and analysis the difference between a hoax and the authentic proves deeply problematic. 7 2. Etymologically we can make some headway with this problem. Deception and con-ception are both derived from the Latin 'capere' (to take, or grasp): the difference in a deception and a conception becomes a difference then between: (a) a marking 'out of ', to be 'from' or 'away from' (de) that which can be taken and (b) to be 'with', 'in association' or together with (con) the taking or grasping. One seems to make an object of that which is to be 'grasped', which implies another meta-position of possibilityoutside that which has been marked out; and the other tends to makes it a subject-in the sense of being together with the person seeking to grasp. The distinction can be understood to hinge upon the question of intentionality or the seriousness of the subject and their speaking or action (which raises questions about how one is to know or decide upon this status); alternatively we could understand this distinction in terms of the degree to which refl exivity is acknowledged, indulged, or pursued.
3. In terms of knowledge, to be the victim or the unwitting victim of a hoax would seem to depend largely upon the status one attributes to the agent, the subject, or knower of knowledge or the hoax-and the sovereignty or self-awareness one is prepared to grant to each respective party. It also depends on the status, hopes and aspirations invested in the The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty project of knowledge and understanding. With the high value and emphasis placed on invention and the startling new fi nding, or the discovery of the incredulous and apparently fantastic, scholars are always susceptible to the fashions of bandwagon theory and philosophy, particularly given the underlying competitiveness and institutionalized compulsion to establish new fi ndings, breakthroughs and novelty.
4. Whilst fashions and bandwagons are not necessarily evidence of hoax, the speed with which new ideas and discourse often take hold does suggest a degree of blindness and ignorance.
8 From Benjamin to Paul de Man and Derrida, we know that all knowledge is dependent on a certain degree of repression and the existence of 'blindspots ' (de Man, 1983; Derrida, 1993) . Unless one accepts the possibility of an authentic affi rmation of selfgrounding and determination (see Heidegger, 1962: sections 1-8) , there is always a necessary vulnerability to being the object rather than the subject of knowledge-an unwitting dupe of unknown or perhaps unknowable conditions of determination and possibility. In academic research this is made worse by the tendency to isolation and specialization that draws scholars away from broader epistemological and ontological questions addressing those historical conditions of possibility that shift and shape the production and nature of knowledge.
5. There is also a tendency for scholars to get lost in the detail of their own research in ways that inhibit deeper and more problematic questions associated with epistemology and ontology and its various historical and social conditions of possibility. A withdrawal from the deeper questions of social science, and indeed to shy clear of the aporias that underpin knowledge and its quest, serves to promote publication and its 'productivity' as each paradigm or sub-disciplinary specialism extends the logic of its project in relative autonomy and semi-isolation. Discourse has a tendency to become highly specialized and thereby inaccessible, even precious and over-refi ned, in equal proportion to its degree of uselessness as it becomes increasingly divorced from anything that might resemble the ordinary language of 'shared reality'.
6. Finally, the status of 'Truth' seems to have been relegated with the recent institutionalization of the idiosyncratic and innovative in organization studies. Here, difference and marginality are being encouraged in ways that are likely to fuel an ever-greater desire for distinction and identity, often through the exercise of creativity and imagination that according to some commentators borders on wilful fantasy and almost an 'in praise of folly' (March, 1995; see Erasmus, 1993) . Given these conditions it is possible to ask if 'HRM' or 'structural contingency' will one day be seen as a curiosity, an error, or worse, evidence of an elaborate series of hoaxes.
9 Indeed, it may be reassuring for science that we still think to ask these questions and to adjudicate truth and fi ction, conception and deception, truth-telling versus tall-tale telling. In their different ways Foucault (1970 Foucault ( , 1972 and Kuhn (1970) both show how the development of academic disciplines, subjects and theory do not observe Organization 14(6) Articles a smooth, linear or cumulative trajectory. We cannot tell, therefore, located in the midst of what will doubtless prove to be 'our' current episteme, what theory, research and writing will stand the test of time and later certifi ed as signifi cant, foundational or seminal. What seems important today, will, in the trial of time, doubtless prove insignifi cant. If we judge importance by popularity or publication sales then it may well be Mullin's Management and Organization Behaviour or Huczynski and Buchanan's Organizational Behaviour that time will treat with disdain. Equally, what seems perverse, outlandish or simply in error, may later be regarded with admiration and respect, deemed seminal or even groundbreaking. We cannot tell whether history will look back on the 'black widow', the 'blowjob' or 'Plasticman' as any more relevant or important for the development of organization studies than 'size', 'structural specialization' or 'strategic choice'. Just as law is founded on lawlessness and violence-indeed law can be understood as a discourse-practice that creates its 'crimes'-sanity requires its madness (Foucault, 1967) , states need war or terror, fact is dependent on fi ction, and truth is pleached with and inseparable from error. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche writes it is only the prejudice of the metaphysicians that insists on the value and dignity of the will-to-truth in which the assumption is made that the cause of things can only be discovered in the things themselves, in the 'womb of being … in the intransitory, in the hidden god, in the "thing in itself"' (Nietzsche, 1973: 34) . The implications of Nietzsche's insight suggest that truth itself could even be a convenient fi ction, a rationale of displacement and repression disguising its equal and opposite shadow, namely a will-to-untruth or a desire for uncertainty and ignorance. Indeed, perhaps there is value in uncertainty and ignorance, that these are dispositions worth cultivating and pursuing. Without it, it would appear, we cannot have knowledge.
Theorizing Organization with its Head in the Clouds: θεωρος on the way to Knowing/ Unknowing
It may not be surprising that forms of writing are emerging in organization analysis that appear to be unconcerned with the kind of consistency and integrity needed to maintain that valued humanist quest for existential authenticity and identity. The increasingly 'light' and improvizational nature of writing that we have called anti-or post-theoretical may well be symptomatic of the demise of philosophical foundation, and the precursor to more experimental modes of research and publication. Apparently frivolous and without depth (cf. Jameson, 1984) , we are perhaps on the threshold of an increasing perversity and heterogeneity in organization studies, marked by the tone of the post-ironic and washed with the same 'postinterested' glaze that is the condition of Baudrillard's children staring at the fl ickering screen of culture on the seeming brink of apocalypse (Dery, 1999; Parfrey, 1990) . In these recent studies of organization, however, there may be nothing so profound, to quote Warhol, as the superfi cial. If everything The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty happens at the surface and in the interstices, as Deleuze reminds us in Difference and Repetition, then one possible solution is the pursuit of a refl exive questioning that eventually issues in the fl attening out of the distinction between the grounded and true against the wilful and fantastic. This levelling out of truth and fi ction might inspire anxiety in response to an apparent indifference to knowledge-claims and the suspension of disbelief that seems to be the logical conclusion of these refl exive exercises. Only by-way of this fatal submission to the critical edge of knowing/unknowing, however, without recourse to procedures of verifi cation, is it possible for organization and its study to be kept alive. It is here that we are forced to think.
It is often said that students of organization today enjoy a new freedom in research and writing, cast loose from the disciplinary training and incarceration of hidebound modernist Theory equipped with its arsenal of techniques and methodological prescription. This conclusion is, however, a mistake. Without limits to transgress, without repression to motivate the quest that is re-search and to inspire writing, nothing would get done and freedom would die. In theorizing we struggle to uncover or invent new limits and to yield to a space of enquiry that extends our attentiveness to those limits we have not yet seen or experienced. Something comes to carry the subject away and compels us to invent rules and procedures as experimental constraints that will help prise open hitherto concealed dimensions of organization. These openings are only possible in proportion to the degree to which our cognitive and sensory receptivity is able to break established routines and patterns.
Nietzsche once wrote that for intellectual growth and development one had to learn how to think against oneself, to invent multiple positions and perspectives, to submit to that trial with the dice-roll which is the craft of those 'philosophers of the dangerous "perhaps"' (Beyond Good and Evil, 2). This 'perhaps' extends to those 'pataphysical experiments of Alfred Jarry (1965) who studied and wrote about anomalies and exceptions to the rule of metaphysics, exceptions that he demonstrates to be supplementary and intrinsic to the truths, reason and logic of orthodox metaphysics rather than simply being fantastical creations residing in some imaginary outside. 'Pataphysics is the "science of imaginary solutions" to the aporetic and tautological "foundations" of knowledge' (Bok, 2002:45) . All knowledge begins with tautology. In this sense 'pataphysics is simply a replica of traditional metaphysics, albeit deviant and more extensive in its "solutions" and mode of operation'. This extensivity helps adumbrate a context within which we can cast new light on the location and understanding of our assumptions, procedures of theoretical study, and methods of orthodox sense-making. This gives rise to all kinds of apparently deluded fantasy and possibility that provides what we might call a 'science' of neglected possibilities and so gives chance to 'realities' that are co-extensive, albeit occluded, within 'paramount reality'. For the 'pataphysician, the world of Tlon (Borges, 1961) , for example, is as real as the mundane world we think Organization 14(6) Articles we inhabit. Here, it is quite possible that a time and motion studies engineer or a blue-coated shop steward in a British car factory rubs shoulders with the revenants of a Gothic castle that in a certain light resembles a pack of screaming maenads enacting some Dionysian orgy (see Burrell, 1997) .
The 'pataphysician, practitioners of which include Jorge Luis Borges, Stanislav Lem, J.G. Ballard and Jean Baudrillard, does not simply chart the absurdities thrown up by society; they adopt and enact its methods, pushing its logic to an extremity of possibility to illuminate a more complex modus vivendi of organization than is typical of more institutionally validated academic studies. It is commonplace these days to observe that scientifi c fact follows or copies science fi ction; analagously, the 'pataphysician invents 'believable untruths' that disrupt, confuse and defl ect the reproduction of mundane order in our paramount reality. And what is capitalist production and the invention of new products and services if not the construction and dissemination of 'believable untruths'? When organization and science is responsible for some of the most fantastical and improbable inventions and curiosities, from the hydro-heated 'two in one couples foot slipper TM ', advertised recently in the US South-West Airlines in-fl ight magazine, to the pornographic interactive holograms modelled on real-live Hollywood stars, the absurdist fictions of the 'pataphysicians begin to appear more sane and credible. The galleries and arcades of the shopping mall display an entourage of such outlandish and grotesque eccentricity that a visitor may not be able to detect truth from fi ction. Where 'incredible verities integrate so perfectly with believable untruths', as Bok (2002) writes, it may not be possible to detect a distinction between fact and hoax. One possible response to these conditions of being is to yield to its logic in order to help push it towards its point of maximum intensity and limit condition, towards that which we might call the organizational 'stuplime' where we might begin to learn how to practice a form of 'stuplicity' (see Ngai, 2000) . Stuplicity is then duplicitous with the apparent stupidity of popular culture. As an exercise it works by association, implication and exaggeration, in a form that resembles what Benjamin (1933) called the 'mimetic faculty'. In his late essays Heidegger would often quote Holderlin to the effect that 'where danger is, grows the saving power also'. Stuplicity seeks to understand and tame that which is terrifying and remote, obdurate and complex, realizing a form of theorizing that enacts a certain 'mimesis and alterity' (Taussig, 1993) . By way of mimesis we fi nd possibilities of alterity.
Long resigned to the impossibility of representation that avoids the entanglement and active participation of the subject in the construction of its 'object' it seems that we can only know or understand 'reality' through participation (which is inevitable). However minor or insignifi cant it might seem, this entangled form of representation and story telling always-already enacts change. By defl ecting the mundane order with their apostrophes and interruptions that make us look twice, 'pataphysicians help us see the boundaries and limitations of what we routinely accept as organizational reality. And someone will say 'there goes that multi-coloured tortoise'. Putting
The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty into play the image of organization as a tortoise shell of encrusted gems crawling across the shimmering carpet of decadence is perhaps an hallucinatory symptom of excess, a McGuffi n of sorts, inspired by dream or sickness; but it is one that intrudes as an anomaly to remind us of the dangers of an ambulatory au-tomatism in organization theory. 'Pataphysics will often seek to go beyond this strategy to enact wilful misreadings of metaphysics in ways that help transpose 'the relationship between a royal paradigm and a nomad parology'; this philosophy of exceptions 'goes even so far as to misread itself' (Bok, 2002: 45) . The folly and fall of theorizing organization in the question of theoretical excess begins to come apart and we are left laughing or shaking our head.
Prising open an epistemological space between belief and the incredulous, the practitioner of this form of theory-in-organization tarries with the possibility of that 'procession of data that Science has excluded' (Fort, 1919) . In his Book of the Damned, Charles Fort enters what he calls a 'Spinozist realm' of enquiry, of 'one inter-continuous nexus, in which and of which, all seeming things are only different expressions', to uncover phenomena in an imminent, intermediate or quasi-state. In his 1923 New Lands Fort extends his study to phenomena of which we remain incredulous or routinely blind. In these studies a synaesthesia of affect is achieved in ways that permit research access to apparently strange dimensions of ontology where we might fi nd columns of 'clouds, different coloured by sunset' that 'have vibrated to the artillery of other worlds like the strings of a cosmic harp'. This is theorizing in the spirit of travel and venture, which is one of the lost root understandings reserved in the Greek θεωρia and from which we derive our word 'theory' (Liddell and Scott, 1843; cf. Lewis, 1879) . It is possible that trapdoors in work organization open onto these clouds where hired assassins are plotting the downfall of organization by hatching plans to develop products such as the Sinclair C5. It is possible that your rhetoric is running a little too fancifully here: authors multiply in a loss of self; a yielding to otherness; becoming strange to ourselves. Not only are clouds circulating within the buildings of work organization, we are now seeing organizations and workplaces that are literally built out of clouds. The media pavilion unveiled and set loose at the 2002 Swiss Expo and designed by the architects Diller and Scofi dio (1999), for example, provides one such challenge to theorizing organization. Constructed as a cloud and maintained by a computerized weather control system 'Blur' compels the cultivation of synaesthetic experience and research methods that intensify our attentiveness to dimensions of organization that we ordinarily repress and exclude. It is here that we can begin to explore the 'pre-human soup', where our hands and faces remain immersed despite their relative pragmatic and contemporary territorialization as a tool-using/speaking couplet (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 64) . The practice of theorizing becomes then a self-disturbing activity of the greatest conscious altering potential when it recovers some of these ancient and forgotten modalities of 'theory' that we see embodied in the Organization 14(6) Articles ancient Greek conception of the θεωρος and θεωρia. The θεωρος, or what we might translate as 'theorist', was a traveller in diplomatic service to the Greek city state who journeyed to see men and things, who literally went 'abroad to see the world', but would often end up residing in foreign lands as an ambassador or an expatriate 'writer in residence'. Fantastic tales of a 'world beyond' invites its tellers and readers to re-think their world and the relation they have established with it. As the Epistulae of Plato suggests (315b), the θεωρος would also act as an envoy sent to consult an oracle and present offerings; Aristotle's use of the term in his Politics (1280 b 28) tells us that the θεωρia would be responsible for attending theatrical productions and the regular festivals and games of the ancient Greek calendar. It is not clear, however, to what extent the θεωρος were of more use if they had 'gone native', or whether they had to preserve an intermedial space in order to narrate and translate foreign customs and practices back into a form accessible to the understanding of native citizens in the theorist's home state.
What we derive from this is a sense of theoretical activity that emphasizes things like travel, fl ight, sacrifi ce, mystery, adventure, translation and narration, all forged out of the experiences of being away from home in a wandering that risks exile and even ostracization. Some of these wandering theorists might remain caught in a zone we might describe as an 'unheimlich intermedium': without state, between borders, struggling to translate between languages and experience, none of which seem native or quite like home, inventing 'conceptual personae' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994) to provide some basis for narration and navigation. This is the becoming minor of language that Deleuze explores, the stuttering inarticulacy of narrative on the threshold of a new nascent sense(-ability) coming into being. Instead of the raising of a monotheistic God (Thea/Theo), which gives us Theoretical (Grand-narrative) endeavour, we have the fall of Theo-and the spectacle of babble, an acephalic babble that might be becoming more vociferous and widespread in our organizations today. The challenge of theorizing (with a lower case t) might be to recover its capacity as medium, a mode of transport that guides us into that plane of consistency where we are re-immersed in that body without organs in an organization study where part-objects might be reassembled out of the material phylum in new ways, recalling memories, histories, and premonitions of alternative modes of being, where hands might become (once again) front paws or an eagles' wing. To take oneself abroad in organization sometimes requires a jewelencrusted tortoise.
Conclusion: At Once Fascinating and Unsettling
We seem to have returned to a situation remarkably similar to our earlier diagnosis of the state of contemporary organizational theorising. We have been participating, apparently, in an ambulatory automatism. Organization studies is replete with an excess of bizarre and grotesque curiosities, with its own collection of asparagus-green chrysoberyls, leak-green peridots, The Question of Theoretical Excess Damian P. O'Doherty purplish-red almandine, the most precious turquoise stones, ouvarite and exotic cat's eyes from Ceylon. A collective babble of incoherence and incommensurability characterized by irony, authorial play, ghost-writing, petit-narratives, and a faint suspicion of speaking in tongues: conditions that help contribute to the volatile and fi ssile nature of contemporary social relations. These are some of the symptoms that are media and outcome of conditions that are giving rise to paranoid cults, acolytes, and devotees, who spiral off into semi-autonomous communities to cultivate excessive refi nement, elaboration and hyperbolae. What is this thing called organization? The treadmill of 'theoretically informed empirical study' still, no doubt, continues to occupy many in organization studies. Moreover, there remain a number of authors unable to escape the identity projection of their own theoretical mise-en-abyme. Others have long given up hope of saying anything meaningful. For some, it is all a game. The collective effect is the production of a glittering tesserae of stories, perhaps aback a rare tortoise shell we might as well agree to call organization studies.
In this return we seem to have simply offered one more contribution to excess-the paper has become itself as apparent victim of the excess that is the putative object of its enquiry. The difference is the possibility provided by a recovery of theorizing in organization, of theorizing as a deterritorialising activity or as a 'pataphysical experiment that does not deny or repress the potential folly of our collective academic endeavour. Rather, theorizing provides space to learn the humility that we might all be speaking in tongues. This folly and fall in theorizing organization condemns us to this uncertain time and place where sense and nonsense are diffi cult to tell apart but in which the creative possibilities on the border with this absurd opens up the everyday mundane as the ludicrous or incredulous. There might be as much sense in developments called 'elaborations of the density dependence model' (Baum, 1996: 85) in the school of organizational ecology as there is in papers that study how a 'Mr. Environment came into the organization, giving orders to change organizational structures and activities' (Westwood, 1999: 203 ; emphasis and font in original). Here profundity can be mistaken for stupidity, and idiocy the savant of a Cassandra or court jester. Learning to keep open and maintain this tension between the credible and the incredulous, the sane and insane, helps develop the space for a queer form of theorizing, an organized stuplicity that keeps organization open through the cultivation of a practice we might want to call 'stuplicity' or 'stuplimity'. The God of fundamentals, the absolute of an ultimate signifi ed, has been dethroned, replaced by a proliferation of pagan gods and talismen. Theo, as God, has fallen; he is no longer in ascendancy. We are now witness to what is perhaps the rising of a new saturnalia of folly and fall. Out of the intermedium dimension of experiment and enquiry traced here anything might happen next, which is perhaps as close to a theoretical prediction of the world of organization as we can expect these daze. You may even begin to theorize (a) tortoise shell … or tortoise a theoretical shell.
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1 In theorizing, language begins to stretch and contort (its) organization. It will sound strangely familiar. Theorizing provokes interruption and speaks from elsewhere, not out of any willful perversity or eccentricity on behalf of some subject, but strictly according to the commitments and implications of theorizing. In this paper queery, stuplicity, theorizing, etc. are performed into a degree of defi nition. In these ways it seeks an intersubjectivity that extends and enhances communication and dialogue, opening up to 'others' and interrupting the economy and reduction that is typically sought by the academic 'article'. 2 We might liken this accumulation of concepts, ideas and 'theories' to that 'banking concept of knowledge' outlined by Paulo Freire (1972) in The Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 3 Theorizing, however, would suggest that difference, proliferation, exaggeration and ontological deconstruction do not simply manifest as the contingent product of certain writers in organization studies. Rather it is inherent to modern social sciences, if not the knowledge quest more generally. In this respect the same point could be made by selecting and working with an alternative series of writers located in more mainstream organizational and administrative science. The following section of the paper develops this point. It is this very problem of 'foundation' that 'theorizing' brings into question as changes/transforms self in relation to experience in organization. 4 McKelvey's characterization of postmodernism is peculiar, to say the least.
Foucault and Latour are identifi ed as postmodernist, for example; and postmodernism is said to be founded on relativism (McKelvey, 2003: 66) . At one point McKelvey singles out Feyerabend as the culprit, 'upon which rests the entire postmodern edifi ce'. This is plainly absurd. Heidegger (1962) is referenced, but if he had been reading (but, apparently, not deliberately so) McKelvey would have been unable to avoid the question that is posed by Heidegger to modern thought-namely, that in raising the question of relativism we have to think about the grounds that would enable the term relativism to make sense. To what is relativism, for example, relative to? McKelvey may not like the caricature of positivism presented in a lot of organization studies, but the idea that Latour's The Pasteurisation of France intends or provides an 'attack against Pasteur's modernism' neither inspires confi dence that Latour has been particularly well read or understood. McKelvey goes on to conclude that there 'is also considerable evidence that postmodernism was a convenient, self-indulgent philosophy promulgated by godfathers who were closet Nazis' (ibid)! This is odd, especially given his ambition to practice the measured and formal sobriety exercised in the 'professional' philosophy of science and to employ a strict justifi cation logic that would allow organization studies to rise above the unreliable methods and fi ndings of the 'trade book and consulting bromides'. 5 McKelvey, for example, wants to discover and demonstrate an ontologically fl uid and complex processuality, but at the same time he appeals constantly to 'objective reality' as a stable point of empirical reference. The process and results of his science produce such things as 'energising order-creating networks of distributed intelligence ' (McKelvey, 2001) and 'Ashby space' in Paretian ontology (Boisot and McKelvey, 2006 ) that gives rise to headless chickens, frogs, and starlings Organization 14(6) Articles 'The more they press and knead it and try to constrain it to their will, the more they provoke the independence of this spirited metal; it escapes their skill and keeps dividing and scattering in little particles beyond all reckoning' (Montaigne, 2003: 994) . The persistent 'discovery' or 'invention' of knowledge might become a game, and our suscipions are certainly raised when one considers the proliferation of fads and fashions in contemporary business and management research (Kieser, 1997) . To give up on the idea of seriousness, to become a 'game player', is to admit complicity in the fabrications and illusions of social science that persists with the hypocrisy that it can generate valuable, value-free knowledge providing a basis upon which policy and intervention can be designed for the purposes of improvement or social advance. In passing through the experience of the aporia that follows this insight, however, and then to perpetrate illusion as a hoaxer, may have its value. Here the seductions of knowledge might become the province of a teachers' carefully crafted tool, helping the other build their own ladder that they will eventually discard.
Where illusion and truth, trick or treat, can no longer be held apart, or where these distinctions are seen as unreliable, fatuous or unworthy-and in the very moment (and only in the moment) of giving-up (cf. Rehn, 2003; Wolff, 1976) -the subject of knowledge indulges hoax at the very moment that it becomes impossible to identify hoax and thereby, perhaps, acquires its value (depending on the commitment of the teacher). This aporia is one apprenticeship in theorizing that opens up the border of organization/disorganization making hoax available as strategy so that we might begin to talk and assume/ affi rm our talk of organization.
